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INTRODUCTION

Marcus C. Strickland Jr. was a timber farmer in Ormond Beach,
Florida. He owned 5000 acres of cypress trees on property that he
inherited from his father, who had been shot and killed during a land
dispute in the late 1940s. The trees represented an inheritance Mr.
Strickland intended to pass on to his three young children-trees as
big around as his outstretched arms, and some over 300 years old. For
a timber farmer, those trees represented $2 million worth of harvest.'
In the summer of 1998, a small lightning fire eventually grew out
of control and threatened tens of thousands of acres of land in Flagler
and Volusia Counties in Florida. Firefighters unsuccessfully attempted to create fire lines through ditches or controlled burns.
Eventually, government officials and firefighters entered Mr. Strick2
land's land.
On June 27, 1998, government workers used a bulldozer to remove Mr. Strickland's fence. In an attempt to create a fire line, they
bulldozed over two miles of his property, cutting trees and destroying
a dike. On July 1, firefighters set two independent fires on Mr. Strickland's property in another attempt to control the spread of the larger
fire. Ultimately, they failed. Mr. Strickland's entire 5000 acres of timber lay ravaged, and the income-producing timber now was nothing
more than a charred parcel of land.3
Mr. Strickland brought a suit under the Takings Clause of both
the Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution. 4 Timberland is not covered by federal crop insurance, so compensation from
the government could be his only remedy. 5 He asserted that public
officials had entered his land and destroyed his property, by bulldozer
and by deliberately-set control fires, causing millions of dollars worth
of damage. Therefore, Mr. Strickland argued, his property had been
I Maya Bell, Family Stands Tough, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 6, 1998, at All; Stacey
Singer, Clinton Callsfor Tourism Boost as Fire Losses Are Tallied, SUN-SENTINEL, July 10,
1998, at 6B.
2 Initial Brief at 1-2, Strickland v, Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 922 So. 2d
1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (No. 5D05-2635).
3 Complaint at 2-5, Strickland v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., No. 02-156CA (Fla. Flagler County Ct. Feb. 5, 2002).
4 Strickland, 922 So. 2d at 1023.
5 Singer, supra note 1.
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taken, and compensation was due. 6 But the court granted summary
judgment for the Department of Agriculture, and Mr. Strickland
appealed.
The District Court of Appeals of Florida found no sympathy for
Mr. Strickland's plight. The court cited United States Supreme Court
cases from the nineteenth century, 7 and the Department of Agriculture cited English common law from the seventeenth century at oral
argument." The court noted that the privilege of necessity exempted
the government from liability, and no compensation was required. It
summarily dismissed his state and federal claims. 9
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not
"be taken for public use, without just compensation."1 0 Despite some
complex balancing tests in the contemporary era, clear rules still do
exist for takings law, and it should be relatively simple to determine
that the government takes property by destroying it. If private property has been destroyed for the greater good of the public, such as a
perfectly good house destroyed to stop the spread of a fire, a compensable taking has occurred and the government owes just compensation. The Supreme Court, however, has held otherwise: it has
preserved an exception for the destruction of property during cases of
necessity, and it has left landowners, including Mr. Strickland, without
compensation." The Court long ago stopped trying tojustify its rationale, instead choosing to rest simply upon Justice Holmes's statement
that this exception to the Fifth Amendment is based "as much upon
tradition as upon principle." 12 This Note will argue that neither principle nor tradition can sustain the injustice that landowners like Mr.
Strickland have experienced. The Fifth Amendment requires compensation for landowners when their property is destroyed for the
public good.
This Note first explores the history of the privilege of necessity
destruction, a common law defense that allows an individual to destroy property for the public good. It analyzes the history of the exception, defining the doctrine and comparing it to the traditional
eminent domain power of the state. In Part I, this Note examines the
6 Complaint, supra note 3, at 9-11.
7 Oral Argument, Strickland, 922 So. 2d 1022 (No. 5D05-2635), video available at
mms://199.242.67.132/5dcaO6janlIoa,at 1:37:15, 1:38:55.
8 Id. at 1:58:50.
9 Strickland, 922 So. 2d at 1023-24..
10 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
11 See, e.g., Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the city should be liable for destroying his home to create a fire break).
12 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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general public necessity, military
three types of necessity destruction:
The general public necesnecessity, and law enforcement necessity.
and it is the source of the origisity privilege has the deepest tradition,
The Note relates its English legal
nal necessity destruction doctrine.'1
Fire of London of 1666, and its
ancestry, its application to the Great
exof military destruction, this Note
American adoption. In the area
background for the privilege.
plores the common law and historical
the most recent adoption of the neFor law enforcement destruction,
Note describes the theory and the
cessity destruction justification, the
American legal history.
Amendment to the privilege
In Part II, this Note applies the Fifth
destruction to be compensable
of necessity, destruction and finds
not
Clause. The Takings Clause had
within the scope of the Takings
did
Clause
the
theories were created,
yet been adopted when the legal
and the Clause was not understood
not originally apply to state action,
exception. The Note then exto encompass any necessity destruction
Constitution and the common law
amines the conflict between the
to reconcile the two areas.
exception, and it rejects the attempt
necessity destruction as some other
Courts have attempted to describe
such as a nuisance theory,
analogous exception to the Takings Clause, an aspect of the police
taking, or
a definition that excludes it as a
shoehorn the necessity deimproperly
power. These comparisons
category, because the privilege
struction privilege into some other
cannot stand on its own.
an examination of the lingerIn Part III, this Note concludes with
to determine if any justificaing policy reasons behind the exception
of contemporary policy concerns.
tion for the exception exists in light
which requires compensation
The maritime law of general average,
property is destroyed in a time of
for property owners at sea whose
property owners should receive simnecessity, suggests that land-based
policy concerns, "in all fairilar compensation. 14 Despite alternative
should be compensated for
ness and justice," property owners 1 5
the
public. The text and policy of
property destroyed to benefit the
this privilege, and injured property
Takings Clause should supersede
owners should receive compensation.

roots of the
the seventeenth century English
13 See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing
exception).
text.
14 See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying
(1960).
49
40,
364 U.S.
15 Armstrong v. United States,
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HISTORY OF THE EXCEPTION

the permanent physical
The Supreme Court6 has held that both
all economically beneficial use
occupation of property' and denial of
The Takings Clause exists "to
7
of property1 are compensable takings.
people alone to bear public burbar Government from forcing some
should be borne by the public
dens which, in all fairness and justice,
18
Takings Clause, however, have
as a whole." These claims about the
of necessity.
not been applied to the privilege
necessity allows the destrucThe common law defense of public
good. The person destroying
tion of private property for the public
official or the actual property
the property need not be a government
owner no recourse and requires no
owner. The law gives the property
law,
public good the supreme
19
compensation. It makes the common
owner.
property
and it trumps the rights of the individual
destruction exist. First, an indiThree primary types of necessity
the spread of a natural disasvidual may destroy property to prevent20
For instance, an individual
ter, usually a fire, flood, or epidemic.
to create a firebreak. Second, the
21
may tear down an untouched housein times of necessity during war.
property
government may destroy
destroy privately owned kegs of
Under this privilege, the army can
enemy from using them. Third, the
flour to prevent the approaching
in times of necessity during law engovernment may destroy property
a home to capture a barricaded
forcement,2 such as burning down
criminal.
has the exclusive auIn the latter two examples, the government
in the former, either public
thority to exercise necessity destruction;
the property. The English common
or private individuals may destroy
variety of policy reasons, predomilaw allowed this privilege for a
take property without compensatnantly because the sovereign could
2" Additionally, the privilege
ing the injured property owner anyway.
necessity should be treated differextended because of the idea that
privilege has thrived under the Latin
ently from other situations. The
health of the people is the supreme
maxim salus populi suprema lex, the
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
16 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
17 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
18 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
19 See infra Part I.A.4.
20 See infra Part I.A.
21 See infra Part I.B.
22 See infra Part I.C.
accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 114-15 and
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law. 24 In the realm of destruction of property for a public use, maxims and history have trumped the text of Takings Clause.
Indeed, courts have readily applied the Takings Clause in a variety of other circumstances where the government takes or uses property. The government's exercise of eminent domain is a taking under
the Fifth Amendment. Eminent domain is "It]he inherent power of a
governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. land, and
convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the
taking. ' 25 When the government takes property without eminent domain, the property owner can bring an inverse condemnation proceeding against the government. 2 6 Formal proceedings are not a
prerequisite for a taking. Though "eminent domain" does not appear
in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has determined that it is "'an
incident of federal sovereignty and an offspring of political necessity.'" 2 7 Additionally, physical invasions of land are takings that re28
quire compensation.
Despite the Court's own use of the term "necessity" to describe
eminent domain, public necessity is a distinct area of the law in the
conversion of property. Public necessity is "[a] necessity that involves
the public interest and thus completely excuses the defendant's liabil29
ity."
The use of the term has been applied inconsistently to three
areas of law where converted property need not be compensated: destruction for public necessity, necessity destruction during war, and
necessity destruction during law enforcement.
A.
1.

Public Necessity

Generally

The common law allowed any citizen to destroy property for the
public use in a time of urgent necessity.30 Commentators have gone
so far as to state explicitly, "The destruction of private property to
prevent the spread of conflagration is not a 'taking of private property
24

See, e.g., Mayor of N.Y. v, Lord, 17 Wend. 285, 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); 4JoHN
1632, at 2846
(5th ed. 1911);JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 87-88 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1690).
F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §

25

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 2004).

26

See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).

27

BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY, supra note
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

25, at 562 (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK &
§ 11.11, at 424-25 (4th ed. 1991) (inter-

nal quotation marks omitted)).
28 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
29 BLACK'S LAW DIcrTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1059.
30 DILLON, supra note 24, § 1632, at 2846.

2oo6]

0 AS

MUCH UPON

TRADITION

AS

UPON

PRINCIPLE"

for public use,' entitling the owner to compensation from the city." '
The privilege has long existed at common law, usually for the prevention of disaster. It is most frequently applied to fire but has also ex-2
tended to other disasters, including flooding and epidemic.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states, "One is privileged to
enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disaster."3 3 Conversion is also permitted: "One is
privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a
chattel or a conversion if the act is or is reasonably believed to be
necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public disaster."3 4 In tort law,
the privilege benefits the public in times of emergency, embodying
the maxim salus populi suprema lex.
Necessity exists for both the good of the public and the good of
the private individual. If an individual converts or destroys property
for the good of a single person, either for herself or for a third party,
then she is liable for the damage caused.3 5 The compensation requirement for private benefits makes sense: an individual should not
be able to swap property arbitrarily, regardless of the relative value.
The conversion looks like theft; however, the law concedes that in
cases of extreme necessity, the individual is privileged to act where she
reasonably believes she needs to act to protect herself or a third party.
The Restatement, though, offers little solace for the private property owner whose property is converted and destroyed for the public
good. Armstrong v. United States3 6 undisputedly explains the rationale
for the Takings Clause, stating that it was "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." - 7
The Restatement admits that although the "moral obligation" to compensate "is obviously very great," municipal actors have generally been
immune from suits of trespass."" Furthermore, the Restatement does
31

Id. at n.1 (emphasis omitted).

32

1 NIc-oLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.43(1), at 841 (Julius L. Sackman et al. eds.,

3d rev. ed. 2006).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965). Whether a disaster is "imminent" is a question to which the courts have generally afforded great deference to the
actor. So long as the individual acts reasonably, even if the disaster was not imminent,
the court would privilege the actor unless he had been negligent.
34 Id. § 262.
35 Id. § 197(2). The individual, however, will not be liable if the conversion is
caused by the possessor's tortious conduct or contributory negligence.
36 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
37 Id. at 49.
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. h (1965).
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not address whether municipalities ought to be held liable for the destruction of property.3 9
The history of necessity destruction privilege began in the English common law, 40 with the preeminent example of the Great Fire
of London of 1666 as a primary justification for the policy behind it.
American case law has largely followed the English history, even
though the Fifth Amendment severely deviated from common law takings jurisprudence.

41

2.

English History
Two English cases in the early seventeenth century
are hallmarks
for the privilege of public necessity. First, The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre12 in 1606 involved a citizen bringing suit against the
Crown for saltpeter taken from his land. The king took the saltpeter
for the benefit of the entire kingdom, but did not claim exclusive possession of the remaining saltpeter or any interest beyond the saltpeter
43
necessary for the defense of the kingdom.
The court did not rest upon the war as justification for the necessity, though the king sought the saltpeter to make gunpowder. The
court emphasized that "every man may come upon my land for the
defence of the realm." 44 Therefore, the privilege was not limited to

the sovereign but was extended to anyone who acted for the public
good. Furthermore, the court noted that "every one hath benefit by
45
it," and that "for the commonwealth, a man shall suffer damage."
The court analogized the situation of destruction to prevent the
spread of a fire, or for war strategy. 46 The court here conflated the
right of the sovereign to enter land and take property with the private
individual's privilege of public necessity. The discussion, however,
may have taken place because parliament could grant a right of compensation, and the king instead tried to argue that liability could not
exist for a privilege that any man may exercise. 47 Under the necessity
privilege, the court permitted the king to take saltpeter from private
39 Id. § 262 cmt. d.
40 See infra Part I.A.2.
41 See infra notes 150-62 and accompanying text,
42 (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (KB.) (decided in December of the fourth regnal
year of James 1, which some sources identify as 1607).
43

Id. at 1295.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46 Id.
47 See MONSIEUR DE VAT'rEL,
2005) (Joseph Chitty ed., 1854).

THE LAW Or NATIONS
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property, because the production of gunpowder benefited the de-

fense of the entire nation. 41 The court found that the privilege applied and was not exclusive to the sovereign. Therefore, no
compensation was due.
The second case was Mouse's Case,49 decided two years later.
Mouse, a barge passenger, lost cargo when it was jettisoned during a
violent storm on the way to London. 50 Various passengers jettisoned
the cargo, and the court refused to hold any of them liable because
their actions were necessary to save the forty-seven passengers on the
barge. 5 1 While the court considered the possibility of compensation
from maritime law, 52 it refused to hold any individual passenger or

the owner of the ship liable. The court reasoned that because "the
danger accrued only by the act of God... everyone ought to bear his
loss for the safeguard and life of a man."53 The comparison to the
"plucking down of a house, in time of fire" again lent to the applica54
tion of the necessity exception.
The rationale in these two cases was generally adopted in the
United States. 55 Interestingly, though neither case concerns destruc-

tion to prevent a fire, both cases refer to fire, and American courts
have used the privilege almost exclusively for that situation. The history behind the Great Fire of London of 1666 also influenced American jurisprudence, because that tale allegedly offered a historic
justification to preserve this privilege.
3.

The Great Fire

In the 1788 case of Respublica v. Sparhawk,5 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defended the doctrine of necessity privilege through the
history of the London Fire from the preeminent narrative of the Earl
of Clarendon. The court described "a memorable instance of folly,"
because the mayor of London refused to tear down houses for fear of
57
being financially liable to the property owners, who were attorneys.
The court reasoned that the law of necessity would eliminate the hesi48
49
regnal
50
51
52
53

Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1295.
(1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.) (decided in the Michaelmas term of the sixth
year of James I, which some sources identify as 1609).
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1341-42.
See infra Part III.A.
Mouse's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1342.

54

Id.

55
56
57

See infra Part I.A,4.
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (Pa. 1788).
Id. at 363.
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tation that paralyzed the mayor of London during that fire, because a
government official would not need to worry about the compensation
due the aggrieved property owner. The history, though, has been
badly muddled and selectively reported.
The court's retelling conflicts with Clarendon's actual account.
Clarendon notes that citizens pressed the mayor to tear down houses
and create a firebreak, and adds parenthetically that "the doing
whereof at that Time might probably have prevented much of the Mischief that succeeded," 58 without the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's

embellished statement that "half that great city was burnt"59 because
of the delay. 60 The narrative in Sparhawk does not rely on the factual
history of Clarendon, but instead presents an inflated picture of
events that justified the court's conclusion.
Diarist Samuel Pepys 'agreed with Clarendon, writing that men
were initially paralyzed and did not attempt to stop the fire. 6 1 Pepys
received word just hours after the fire began September 2, and immediately went to the king, who "commanded me to go to my Lord
Mayor from him, and command him to spare no houses, but to pull
down before the fire every way."' 62 The very same day, however, Pepys
recalls that the mayor had been tearing down houses all day: "To the
King's message [the mayor] cried, like a fainting woman, 'Lord! what
can I do? I am spent: people will not obey me, I have been pulling down
houses; but the fire overtakes us faster than we can do it.'" 6 3 The futility of

tearing down houses also appears certain in Pepys's account, because
58

3

EDWARD EARL OF CLARENDON, THE CONTINUATION OF THE LIFE OF EDWARD

674 (Oxford, Clarendon Printing House, 1759) (emphasis
added).
59 Sparhawk, I U.S. (1 Dall.) at 363,
EARL OF CLARENDON

60

This embellishment is among the most egregious of the Sparhawk court. The

now-forgotten history of Clarendon then indicates that the mayor refused to tear
down houses because "that He durst not do it without the Consent of the Owners."
CLARENDON, supra note 58, at 674 (internal quotation marks omitted) (spelling mod-

ernized). The text does not claim that it was because the lawyers' property was in
peril, but instead that the lawyers agreed with the legal analysis of the mayor. Id. The
very next day after the fire began, however, Clarendon writes that "the Fire was too
ravenous to be extinguished with such Quantities of Water as those Instruments could
apply to it, and fastened still upon new Materials before it had destroyed the old. And
though it raged furiously all that Day, to that Degree that all Men stood amazed, as
Spectators only .. " Id. at 660-61. The simplistic assertion that the mayor may have
stopped the fire through speedy action is dubious, because the morning after the
mayor's alleged inaction, the fire had become insatiable,
61 5 THE DiRy OF SAMUEL PEPns 393 (Henry B. Wheatley ed., G. Bell & Sons
1946) (1665).
62 Id. at 393-94.

63

Id. at 394

(emphasis added).
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he describes houses at least six away from each other catching on fire,
which would require a tremendous fire break well in advance of the
progressing flame., 4 Pepys notes that even though the mayor was not
at fault for the fire, "[p]eople do all the world over cry out of the
simplicity of my Lord Mayor in general; and more particularly in this
business of the fire, laying it all upon him. ' 65 The London Gazette's

own report of the episode closely imitates Pepys, emphasizing repeatedly that homes were torn down, describing that the fire was unstoppable, and blaming only the weather for the bad fortune. 6 3
The Great Fire of London of 1666 is an episode quickly cited in
support of the necessity privilege exception, 67 but one with disputable
history at best and false conclusions at worst. History shows that public officials did the best they could to prevent the spread of the fire,
even though they were not given the additional incentive of the necessity privilege. The mythic conception created by the Sparhawk court
that the mayor could have stopped the fire with a necessity privilege
doctrine is too much conclusion and too little fact. American courts,
however, have continued to use this conclusion and its English legal
predecessors to defend the privilege.
4.

American History

The first prominent American case to address the privilege of private necessity was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sparhawk, which
took place in 1788 well before the idea of compensation for destruction had swept many constitutions. 68 Sparhawk brought the privilege
of public necessity into the American legal corpus. The facts did not
ostensibly implicate the privilege of public necessity: 227 barrels of
flour had been moved by the government to a depot in anticipation of
the invasion of British troops, who eventually took the depot and the
flour.6 9 The court then examined the common law history, emphasizing that "[tihe transaction, it must be remembered, happened
flagrante bello; and many things are lawful in that season, which would
not be permitted in a time of peace.
64
65

' 70

Again, despite the fact that

Id. at 396.
Id. at 405.

66 THE LONDON GAZE-rE, Sept. 3-10, 1666, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
images/ london-gazette-fire-of-london.gif.

67 See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155 n.7 (1952) (quoting
Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) 357, 362 (Pa. 1788), and its account of the
Great Fire).
68 See infra Part II.B.
69 Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 358.
70

Id. at 362.
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the case was related to war and not to a natural disaster like a fire, the
court placed its emphasis upon the unique circumstances that would
permit the privilege of necessity.
The coui-t carefully distinguished the seizure of property that
would be a trespass from the "rule . . . that it is better to suffer a

private mischief, than a public inconvenience; and the rights of necessity,
form a part of our law."'71 The opinion then specifies several cases of
necessity for the public safety: trespass to land if the road is damaged,
trespass to land if an individual is assaulted, bulwarks built on land
during war, and the situation in the present case. 72 The first example
is taken directly from Blackstone, 73 and the rest from various English
common law sources. 7 4 The court then enumerated several other exceptions: use of the banks of navigable waterways for towing; pursuit
of noxious foxes across private property; disruption of consensual
fighting, even when the fight takes place in a private home; and destruction of houses to prevent the spread of fire. 75 Again, the court
refers to a series of English common law treatises, referring in the
final instance to the Great Fire of London of 1666.76

After tracing the numerous instances where necessity justifies action "for the public good," the court concluded:
Congress might lawfully direct the removal of any articles that were
necessary to the maintenance of the Continental army, or useful to
the enemy, and in danger of falling into their hands; for they were
vested with the powers of peace and war, to which this was a natural
and necessary incident: And, having done it lawfully, there is nothing in the circumstances of the case, which, we think, entitles the
77
Appellant to a compensation for the consequent loss.
The privilege became "well settled common law," even before the passage of any constitutions, when taking place "in cases of actual necessity,-as that of preventing the spread of fire,-the ravages of a
pestilence, or any other great calamity.. . . -7" Even though the case
took place before the Takings Clause had even been proposed, public
necessity would be used in the future to shield the government from
liability.
71
72

Id.
Id. at 363.

73

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

74
75

2 COMMENTARIES *36.
Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 363.
Id.

76

See supra Part I.A.3.

77 Sparhawk, I U.S. (1 Dali.) at 363.
78 FORTUNATUS DWARRiS, A GENERAL
Albany, William Gould & Son 1885).

TREATISE ON STATUTES 444

(Platt Potter ed.,
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itself in lumping neSparhawk, however, may have overextended
categories of necessity. For
cessity destructionwith these other general
are not as urgent cases of
instance, some of the situations mentioned
need to use the banks of navigable
necessity as the court suggests: the
rather small. Instead, the court rewaterways or to hunt foxes seems
than any urgent need. Additionlies upon the "public good" rather
areas of law. Laws about
ally, many exceptions conflate distinct
animal control may not necessa79
fighting, the title of beach fronts, and

in the law of public necessity.
rily find their strongest defenders
particby most of these cases is de minimis,

Finally, the loss created
the complete destruction of priularly when compared to the loss or
allow trespass to land, which
vate property. Most of the exceptions
compensation. Good policy
would result in little more than nominal
damages for trespass in cases of newould presumably forbid punitive
not implicate the policy concerns
cessity, because the trespass0 would
that usually trouble courts.
followed Sparhawk and
Despite these policy arguments, states
The first significant decisions readopted the English common law.
in a series of New Jersey cases
flecting the policy of necessity came
81
fire in New York. State actors
about property destroyed in an 1835
goods within it to prevent a fire
destroyed a print shop and all the
82 The parties hotly disputed whether a statute enafrom spreading.
buildings in a time of fire, but the
bled the state officials to tear down
a statute, authorized the destruccourt emphasized that necessity, not
the taking of property that
tion.8 3 The court distinguished between
within the scope of the constituwas an "attribute of sovereignty" and
was the right of any individual
tion, and the taking of property 8 that
4
necessity.
who acted in a time of
since cases like Pierfoxes has presumably improved
79 Moreover, today's view of
Sup. Ct. 1805).
son v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y.
164-65 (Wis. 1997).
Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154,
Steenberg
v.
80 See, e.g.,Jacque
sub nom. Hale v.
21 N.J.L. 248 (N.J. 1847), rev'd
81 Am. Print Works v. Lawrence,
that the
ground
the
1848). The case was reversed on
Lawrence, 21 NJ.L. 714 (N.J.
that
domain
eminent
of
necessity, but actually a grant
statute was not a regulation of
explained later by

N.J.L. at 733-36. Ultimately, as
required compensation. Hale, 21
by expanding the
the privilege of necessity, such as
Nichols, if a state tries to add to
then the
"necessity,"
"emergency" rather than just
right to destroy property in times of
official,
public
A
and requires compensation.
right becomes one of eminent domain
landowner.
a
to
liable
not
is
privilege,
scope of the
however, acting within the normal
supra note 32, § 1.43(2), at 845.
DOMAIN,
EMINENT
ON
NICHOLS
82 Am. Print Works, 21 N.J.L. at 255-56.
under
that the destruction was even a taking
83 Id. at 258-59. It further admitted
256.
Id. at
the state constitution, but not compensable.
257.
at
Id.
84
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in the case, the court
After determining that necessity applied
necessity from a taking for public
tried to distinguish taking for public
good:
necessity, and they doubtThey are both spoken of as grounded on
an individual necessity,
less are so. But the one is a state, the other
good. The one is a
though ofttimes resulting in a public or general
on property and
civil, the other a natural right. The one is founded
no
other has 8 5connexion [sic]
is an exercise of sovereignty. The
or the other.
one
with, or dependence upon, the
for the benefit of the State or the
The court added that necessity is not
86
of a few, or of many." The reaone,
of
benefit
"the
for
but
public,
from the kind authorized by the
soning distinguished the destruction
The definition of necessity
statute in order to vindicate state liability.
of the state, to destruction
emphasized the natural right, independent
its case, because the act
in such circumstances. The court overstated
or private,8 7and the scope of the
of necessity may be divided into public
for compensation.
action alters the requirement
to consider whether the statMost importantly, the court refused
and held the state liable where
ute overrode the existing common law
all, it found the destruction a
it would naturally bear no liability. After
refused compensation. Neverthetaking under the constitution but
to this position in subsequent
less, the New Jersey courts adhered
that necessity "is essentially a
cases from the same episode and held 88s
right."
private and not a public or official
Supreme Court's 1879 decision
In the years approaching the
9l
90
89
and Texas presented prominent
Bowditch v. Boston, cases in Iowa
the line of reasoning from Mouse's
examples of state courts adopting
necessity privilege to prevent the
Case or Sparhawk when justifying the
invoked commentator John Dilspread of a fire. State courts often
maxim salus populi suprema lex, he
lon's explanation: from the popular
in "the public necessity, the public
justified an exemption from liability
good did not require the act to be
good; and, therefore, if the public
and reasonably necessary,-the
done,-if the act was not apparently
9 2 Without much deresponsible.
actors cannot justify, and would be

85 Id. at 258 (spelling modernized).
86
87
88
Works,
89
90
91
92

Id.
text.
See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying
1848) (reversing American Print
(NJ.
729
714,
N.J.L.
21
Hale v. Lawrence,
21 NJ.L. 248).
101 U.S. 16 (1879).
575, 577 (1874).
Field v. City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa
614, 615 (Tex. 1879).
Tex.
50
Christi,
Keller v. City of Corpus
at 2846.
DILLON, supra note 24, § 1632,
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bate, virtually every state that confronted the issue had adopted the
common law exception despite the takings clause of each state's
93
constitution.
The last and most significant case to question necessity destruction takings was Bowditch, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
privilege. 94 The Court's jurisdiction in Bowditch, however, arose only
incidentally from the relationship of the parties in a bankruptcy dispute, so the only questions presented turned on an interpretation of
state law; the Court did not examine the Fifth Amendment at all.9 5
Bowditch lost his building when firemen successfully exploded it
to prevent the approaching fire from spreading, and he sought recovery only for the destroyed goods that he could have removed from the
96 The Court cited the usual litany
building before the fire reached it.
of cases justifying the privilege and denying compensation to Bowditch: Saltpetre, Mouse's Case, Sparhawk9 7 The case is largely unremarkable in its defense of necessity, except that it was the first time the
United States Supreme Court had clearly enunciated the doctrine.
The Court reasoned, "At the common law every one had the right to
destroy real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire, and there was no responsibility on the
part of such destroyer, and no remedy for the owner."98 Even though
the Court was interpreting state law and not the federal Constitution,
the Court's articulation of this doctrine would implicate future necessity jurisprudence that did relate to the Fifth Amendment.9 9 The
Court denied Bowditch compensation for a destruction that had benefited the community, and the Fifth Amendment would be forever
interpreted through this holding.

93 The only state case to hold otherwise was Bishop & Parsons v. Mayor of Macon, 7
Ga. 200, 202 (1849).
94 Bowditch, 101 U.S. at 18-19.
95 Id. at 19.
96 Id. at 16.
97 Id. at 18-19.

98

Id. at 18.

99 Bowditch took place in 1879, eighteen years before the Takings Clause would
be incorporated against the states. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). Bowditch, however, became the ideal justification of the
necessity defense, twice cited in the watershed compensation case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,.1029 n.16 (1992); id. at 1048 n.8 (Blackmun,j.,

dissenting).

.....

496

.

I
NOT

B.

x

T AXA7 I/lCv1EW

DAMT
u,

W.

[VOL. 82:1

R,.V..

Military Necessity Destruction

necessity destruction durThe second type of necessity privilege is
destruction during times of war
ing war. The necessity privilege for
the general principle of public
was often used interchangeably with
only the
100 The two principles are not identical; they share
necessity.
time of
a
in
may be destroyed
central traits of the privilege: property
good.
necessity for the benefit of the public
during war, natural law
Regarding damage caused by the military
damages are to be made good to
scholar Emer de Vattel wrote, "Such
his quota of the loss."'1' The
the individual, who should bear only
however, insisted, "It is leEnglish editor's reply to Vattel's comment,
the benefit of the community, and
gal to take possession of these for
nor is any recoverable, unless given
no action lies for compensation,
10 2 Vattel did distinguish between military acts
by act of parliament."
precaution," and military acts that
"done deliberately and by way of
misfortunes which chance deals out
were "merely accidents,-they are
0 3 He emphasized
happen to fall."'
to the proprietors on whom they
public finances, require an "impracthat the latter would exhaust the
create "a thousand abuses" to
ticable" contribution from the citizens,
0 4 The problems that
particulars."'
the system, and find "no end of the
the benefits of compensatwould be created, he argued, outweighed
ing those injured by necessity destruction.
Vattel's analysis
Applied to contemporary takings jurisprudence,fall upon the citiof war generally
remains accurate. The misfortunes
those misfortunes has never been
zens affected, and compensation for
5
a society." 10 Furthermore,
"intended by those who united to form
when the army tries to protect
the incidental loss of private property
as beneficial. Without the
or regain that property has been regarded would be entirely lost.
property
protection of the army, the private
sovereign ought to be "equitathe
that
Vattel, however, did argue
ruined by
unhappy sufferers who have been
ble" and "Just" to "those
1 0 6 He compared the debt of the state to injured
the ravages of war."
of families whose head had been
property owners as equal to that
con10 7 He surmised, "There are many debts which are
killed in duty.
text.
See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying
402.
at
47,
note
101 VATrEL, supra
102 Id. at 402 n.181.
103 Id. at 402.
104 Id. at 402-03.
105 Id. at 403.
106 Id.
107 Id.
100
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sidered as sacred by the man who knows his duty, although they do
not afford any ground of action against him." 10° Vattel determined
that the injustice suffered by property owners triggered an obligation
from the state to compensate. The United States federal government
often has not felt so obliged.
The federal government's own analyses of the military necessity
exception during World War II held that enemy property taken or
destroyed was not compensable.10 9 Invoking the principles of Bowditch and other natural disaster cases, the Department of Justice defended the no compensation principle and argued that 'justification
may be found for the practice of destroying property within the zone
of actual military operations to prevent its falling into the hands of the
enemy or for other military purposes without payment of compensation to the owner."'1 0 Admitting that the distinction between destruction and taking was not entirely clear,' II the Department nevertheless
clung to the public necessity language. A report from the Department
cited Justice Holmes in a Massachusetts decision:
When a healthy horse is killed by a public officer, acting under a
general statute, for fear that it should spread disease, the horse certainly would seem to be taken for public use, as truly as if it were
seized to drag an artillery wagon. The public equally appropriate it,
1 12
whatever they do with it afterwards.
The Department summed up its position by distinguishing eminent
domain, which did require compensation, from other government activities that did not use eminent domain.1 13 The necessity exception
privileged the government for destruction in war just as it had for individuals destroying property for the public good to prevent a natural
disaster.
C. Law Enforcement Necessity Destruction
The third type of necessity privilege is necessity destruction during law enforcement. At English common law, the government as sov108
109

Id.
LANDS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR WAR PURPosEs 78 (1944) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTiCE, ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY]; LANDS
DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 72
(1941) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T oFJUSTICE, EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY]. The government, however, failed to make an explicit parallel holding regarding allied property

destroyed during the war.
110 U.S. DEP'T or JUSTICE,
IIl Id.at9l n.340.
112
113

EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY,

supra note 109, at 90.

Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100, 102 (Mass. 1891).

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

ACQUISITION

OF PROPERTY,

supra note 109, at 86.
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ereign owed no compensation for any taking, destruction or
otherwise, unless parliament granted it. 14 Blackstone thought that
compensation should be due, but the English courts emphasized that,
as wise as the policy may be, it was not required. 1 15 Destruction
caused by the sovereign in the exercise of law enforcement would not
be compensated, and it was not protected under the "necessity" defense until the late twentieth century. 116
The necessity justification for law enforcement destruction cobbled together a variety of theories to prevent the expansion of liability
to the state. A 1995 California case, Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 7 exemplifies the theory promulgated. Police used tear gas to
capture a criminal who had hidden in the plaintiffs store.",
The California Supreme Court first emphasized:
Neither the "taken" nor the "or damaged" language ever has been
extended to apply outside the realm of eminent domain or public
works to impose a constitutionally-based liability, unamenable to legislative regulation, for property damage incidentally caused by the actions of public employees in the pursuit of their public duties.' "1
Even though the California Constitution contained the words "or
damaged" as a circumstance beyond a "taking" that required compensation, the Supreme Court of California refused to recognize recovery
in this case. It examined the history and found that the language only
applied to the traditional bounds of eminent domain. 20 It then used
the "emergency exception" doctrine as an alternative ground to explain the refusal to compensate:
The emergency exception has had a long and consistent history in
both state and federal courts. It is a specific application of the general rule that damage to, or even destruction of, property pursuant
114 William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553,
572-88 (1972).
115 Governor & Co. of the British Cast Plate Mfrs. v. Meredith, (1792) 100 Eng.
Rep. 1306, 1307-08 (K.B.); see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
116 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
117 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995).
118 Id. at 902-04. The plaintiff failed to submit a proper federal question, and
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court presumably for this reason. Customer
Co. v. City of Sacramento, 516 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1996). According to the California
Supreme Court, the plaintiff only brought an inverse condemnation claim instead of
a tort claim, and he did not make a federal takings claim. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at
904-05, 905 n.2. The city also insisted that no federal claim was properly submitted.
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-9, Customer Co., 516 U.S.
1116 (1996) (No. 95-980), 1996 WL 33467250.
119 Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 906.
120 Id. at 906-07.
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to a valid exercise of the police power often requires no compensa12
tion under the just compensation clause. 1
The court's light treatment of the emergency exception assumed that
the exercise of law enforcement alone was a sufficient prerequisite for
application of the necessity doctrine, a trait heretofore unknown to
the doctrine of necessity. Historically, necessity destruction had been
grounded in policy objectives distinct from the exercise of the police
power, but California unified the two doctrines.
The court also asserted the same traditional policy concerns behind the doctrine. Officers must be able to act without concern of
later liability and professional discipline.1 22 The court echoed Vattel's
concern that increased liability "would constitute a significant, unprecedented, and unwarranted expansion of the scope of the just
23
compensation requirement."
Various state courts invoked similar reasoning relating to the priv124
ilege of destruction during the exercise of law enforcement.
Others insisted that the privilege fell under the text of the takings
clause of state constitutions. 125- Whether explicit or implicit, all the
opinions struggle with the consequences of law enforcement for the
public good during a time of necessity. State courts have limited the
text of state constitutions in numerous ways: limiting takings to eminent domain, distinguishing takings from the police power, or restricting the scope of the term "public use." The federal issue of takings
121 Id. at 909.
122 Id. at 910-11.
123 Id. at 911.
124 See, e.g., McCoy v. Sanders, 148 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (emphasizing that the police power is derived from necessity and "is not to be confused with the
power of eminent domain"); Ind. State Police v. May, 469 N.E.2d 1183, 1184 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding that the destruction did not amount to eminent domain but was
"the nature of tort"); Kelley v. Story County Sheriff, 611 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Iowa 2000)
(finding that the destruction in question looked more like an exercise of the police
power rather than of eminent domain); Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 42 N.E.2d
158, 160 (Ohio 1942) (finding "moral" but "no legal basis" for compensation for the
destruction of property); Sullivant v. City of Okla. City, 940 P.2d 220, 226-27 (Okla.
1997) (invoking the standards from Customer Co., 895 P.2d 900, to exclude a compensation requirement for the destruction of property during the exercise of the police
power).
125 See, e.g., Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Minn.
1991) (construing the takings clause of the state constitution to require compensation
for destruction); Wallace v. City of Atlantic City, 608 A.2d 480, 483 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1992) (holding that damage committed for the public good requires compensation by the public); Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1980)
(invoking the Armstrong principle of "fairness and justice" to require compensation
for destroyed property).
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and the nagging question of
has been lightly skirted or flatly ignored,
in these cases where nethe Fifth Amendment remains unaddressed
cessity has been invoked.
II.

TH4E

OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
HISTORY AND APPLICATION

to protect any of
The Fifth Amendment has not been extended
The Takings Clause
these three categories of necessity destruction.
each offer reasons in their
and the Compensation Clause, however,
to apply the Fifth
text alone and in their historical underpinningsbeen destroyed durhas
Amendment to landowners whose property
requirement in the Constiing times of necessity. The compensation
common law of necessity, and
tution is therefore in conflict with the
to trump the Compensacourts have used the common law exception
the definitional scope of a taktion Clause. The nuisance exception,
avenues by which courts have
ing, and the police power have all been
for property owners. In light of
rejected a compensation requirement
however, none of these
the plain meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
efforts is convincing.
A.

The Takings Clause

only a sovereign can take
According to the common law history,
of necessity is not a taking. The
property, and destruction in times
supersedes this traditional
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
do not trump the rights
understanding. Common law exceptions
Constitution, and the text effectively
guaranteed under the text of the
26
law.
supersedes the common
is not limited to government
Furthermore, the Takings Clause
Clause requires that no "private propactors. In the passive voice, the
127 The requirement "for public use" sugerty be taken for public use."'
against the sovereign,
gests that this clause should apply exclusively
domain. On its
eminent
because governments alone may exercise
to "eminent domain" or the
face, however, the Clause is not limited
taking "for public use" and reactions of the sovereign. It allows any
text suggests that a private citiquires "just compensation." The plain
another and use it to the benefit
zen may take the private property of
the Suprotected states from lawsuits, but
126 For example, sovereign immunity
no
states
the
that
(1793),
2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419
preme Court held in Chisholm v. Georgia,
the
ratified
they
after
in certain circumstances
longer had that traditional privilege
the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment,
response,
In
420.
at
Id.
Constitution.
in those circumstances.
immunity
which restored their sovereign
added).
(emphasis
V
127 U.S. CONST. amend.
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of the public. 128 After all, under the privilege of public necessity,
completely apart from the Fifth Amendment, a private citizen could
convert property for the public benefit in extreme circumstances.
The text of the Clause only requires that the taking be for public use,
regardless of who takes the property, and the common law doctrine of
public necessity provides a private actor with the ability to "take" property for the public use.
An argument from the text alone may look like a charlatan's trick
to expand the interpretation of the Takings Clause. But similar takings clauses of the era support this interpretation. While little history
exists regarding the passage of the original Takings Clause, some indicates that it was not limited to eminent domain. The federal govern9
ment did not enact a federal eminent domain statute until 1888.12
Previously, the federal government used state law to take land, but the
Supreme Court in 1896 held that the power of eminent domain inhered in the federal sovereign irrespective of any other affirmative
grant.'3 0 If the federal government takes land without the procedural
safeguards of eminent domain, the injured property owner may file an
inverse condemnation claim against the government.' 3' The government must pay for the property taken if the inverse condemnation
claim is successful, despite the fact that the government did not formally exercise its power of eminent domain. 13 2 Whether the federal
government took property through its own eminent domain power,
through state mechanisms, or without any formalities, the Takings
Clause required compensation for the injured property owner.
American colonies had no consistent takings principles before
the Revolution. In 1641, Massachusetts deviated from the previous
default English position of denying compensation when it provided
compensation for property if "goods should perish,"1 33 a phrase that
includes both useful and destroyed property. Vermont required com128 Other laws also hold that private citizens may violate public rights. For instance, suits may be filed against private parties acting under color of state law for
statutory violations enforced under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000).
129 Act of Aug. 1, 1888, ch. 728, 25 Stat. 357 (repealed 2002).
130 Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499, 510 (1896).
131 United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
132 United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 464-65 (1903).
133 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and
the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUrM. L. REv. 782, 785 (1995) (quoting MAss. BODY OF LIBER
TIES § 8 (1641), reprinted in SoURcEs OF OUR LIBaRTis 148, 149 (Richard L. Perry &

John C. Cooper eds., 1952)).
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pensation whenever land was taken "for use of the public."' - 4 The
Massachusetts Constitution followed in 1780 with a compensation requirement for takings during "public exigencies,"' 3 5 a phrase that encompasses property taken in a time of necessity. The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 also required compensation "[s]hould the public
exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation." 1 36 These

documents contradict the common law assumptions about the privilege of necessity destruction, because terms embodying both destruction and necessity were codified in contemporary legislation. Courts
have also acknowledged that takings embody destruction. During the
New York fire cases, for instance, the NewJersey Supreme Court held,
"Nor is it denied that the destruction of private property for public use
'1 7
is a taking of it within the meaning of the constitution." Legal scholars have agreed with this definition, and even the Department ofJustice has admitted that the definition is at the very least
open to debate. 38 Richard Epstein aligns conversion and destruction
because they perform the same deprivation of property rights. 39 He
writes, "Surely no one would argue that the state does not take private
property when it blows up a building, or that thereafter it can con40
demn the land without paying for the building it has destroyed."'
Therefore, he concludes, "The eminent domain clause must apply
whether the government takes or destroys private property."' 4' Bruce
134
STATE

STATES,

Id. at 790 (quoting VT. CONST. ch. 1,art. II, reprinted in 6 THE
CONSTITUTIONS,

COLONIAL

TERRITORIES, AND

CItARTERS, AND

COLONIES

Now

OTHER

OR HERETOFORE

ORGANIC

FEDERAL AND
LAWS

OF THE

FORMING THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 3737, 3740 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909)).
135 Id. (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, part 1, art. X, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES,

TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE

FORMING THE UNITED

AMERICA 1888, 1891 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909)).
136 Id. at 791 (quoting Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. II, reprinted in SOURCES
OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 133, at 392, 395). Interestingly, although the Northwest
Ordinance delegated local control in the territory over issues like education, other
areas, including the requirements for takings and compensation, found no such deference to local decision-making bodies. See generally LARRY P. ARNN, LIBERTY AND
LEARNINc 4-5 (2004) (discussing the delegation of authority in the Northwest Ordinance, particularly in education).
137 Am. Print Works v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 248, 256 (NJ. 1847), rev'd sub nom.
Hale v. Lawrence, 21 NJ.L. 714 (NJ. 1848) (finding that the New York statute created
a right of eminent domain instead of codifying necessity destruction).
138 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY, supra note 109, at 91
n.340.
139 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 38 (1985).
STATES

140
141

OF

Id.
Id.
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Ackerman agrees that the plain meaning of "taking" embodies "destruction." 142 Property can be taken without it being given to anyone
in particular, for "if a Layman can properly use language in this way, it
follows that an Ordinary Observer will recognize a prima facie taking
not only when Layman's thing has been transferredto a third party but
when it has been utterly destroyed by the state as well."'143 The plain
meaning of the text and contemporary documents give a strong preference to include destruction within the scope of the word "taking."
If this definition of a taking is accepted, then even private individuals who act on behalf of the public good fall within the scope of the
Takings Clause, and property owners should receive just compensation for their loss. Courts have carefully distinguished the privilege of
necessity from other conversions that are exclusively granted to the
sovereign. 144 The Supreme Court, however, has articulated the oftinvoked and highly abstract principle that "[t]he Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.

'145

The

principle focuses upon the harm caused to property owners rather
than the action of the government. As a dissenting justice noted in
the New York fire cases, "Icannot but think that [the destruction] ...
may well be said to be a taking for a public use. The whole city may in
turn be exposed to the same danger, and the whole city may in turn
be obliged to appeal to the same means of protection." 4 6 This policy
of compensating property owners who bore public burdens continued
14 7
through Armstrong and exists in the present day.
The other popular competing principle about the purpose of the
Takings Clause is that compensation for takings prevents the arbitrary

142 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 129-36
(1977).
143 Id. at 130.
144 See, e.g., 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATmsE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES § 7, at 16-17 (3d ed. 1909) ("[The privilege of private necessity) is
plainly distinguishable from the right of eminent domain. It is a right which exists in
the individual, and not in the State; by nature, and not as the result of political
organization.").
145 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
146 Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714, 748 (N.J. 1848) (Carpenter, J., dissenting).
147 See, e.g.,
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citing Armstrong's "fairness and justice" principle).

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

82:1

deprivation of property by the government. 148 This philosophy behind the takings doctrine was promulgated by St. George Tucker in
his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries.1 4 9 If arbitrariness were the
sole concern of the Takings Clause, then necessity privilege would not
conflict with that goal, because property would be destroyed under
times of actual necessity and therefore not for an arbitrary or capricious purpose.
But if the Armstrong principle of "fairness and justice" is truly the
impetus behind the Takings Clause, then compensation should be
due regardless of the actor, so long as the actor does destroy the property
"for public use." If the arbitrariness principle is the impetus, then
compensation should be limited to occasions where arbitrariness is a
concern. The tension between the Armstrong principle and the arbitrariness principle is best reflected in the debate about the meaning
and application of the Compensation Clause.
B.

The Compensation Clause

William Michael Treanor traces the history of the Compensation
Clause, emphasizing that the original understanding was clear on two
points: the government compensated physical takings, and the government did not compensate land regulation.' 5 0 American colonies
1 51
had no consistent compensation principles before the Revolution.
The colonies often adopted the standard English position of voluntary
compensation, which allowed the sovereign to take property and required no compensation, although sometimes the sovereign chose to
compensate.1 52 Later statutes and constitutions began to adopt a
compensation requirement.153 For instance, although improving un148 See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Takings Analysis of PoliceDestruction of Innocent Owners' Property in the Course of Law Enforcement: The View from Five State Supreme Courts, 34
McGEORGE L. REv. 1, 17 n.166 (2002).
149 St. George Tucker, Of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

app. at 305 (photo. reprint 1969) (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William
Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (stating that the Compensation Clause "was
probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining suppli-

ers for the army"). Tucker wrote before 1795, so his comments are arguably most
authoritative on the interpretation of the Constitution. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W.
11-12 (2002).
Treanor, supra note 133, at 782.
See Stoebuck, supra note 114, at 579-88 (discussing the compensation requireof the various colonies and their underlying principles).
See id. at 575-88.
See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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improved lands traditionally did not require compensation, Vermont
altered that tradition with its constitution of 1777 by requiring compensation even for improvement of unimproved property. 15 4 This history cuts against the arbitrariness principle, because the government's
improvement of land does not indicate the arbitrary taking of property.
These statutes that first adopted a compensation requirement followed a long line of legal theorists, including Samuel Pufendorf and
55
William Blackstone, who defended the need for compensation'
Pufendorf insisted that if property were taken for public purposes, the
share that the property owner did not deserve to bear "ought to be
refunded to that citizen from the public treasury, or by contribution
of the other citizens, so far as possible."1 56 Pufendorf distinguished
between the regulation and the taking of property.' 5 7 He conceded,
however, that an exception may exist in times of necessity and for
damage that was "inevitable," though he did not advocate the exception. 158 He limited the principle to cases where the property owners
59
"tacitly confirmed" government destruction of property in advance.'
How to determine tacit confirmation was never discussed.
Blackstone insisted that when the government took private property from a citizen, it should "giv[e] him a full indemnification and
equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now consid1 60
ered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange."
He argued that the legislature needed a check, because the possession
of this exclusive power was one that would unjustly harm the property
owner, who would be stripped arbitrarily of his property. 6 ' Though
Blackstone's native England did not look so kindly upon his commentary,162 the Founders relied upon Blackstone and adopted a compensation clause in the Bill of Rights.
154 William Michael Treanor, The Origins and OriginalSignificance of theJust Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695, 702-03 (1985).
155 James W. Ely, Jr., "That Due Satisfaction May Be Made:" The Fifth Amendment and
the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEcAL HiST. 1, 16-17 (1992).
156 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE OFFICtIo HOMINIS ET Cyvas JUXTA LEGEM NATURALEM
LiBi Duo (Frank Gardner Moore trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682), reprinted in
2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (James Brown Scott ed., 1995).
157 Id.
158 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DEJuRE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LiBin OCTO (C.H. Oldfather

& W.A. Oldfather trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1934) (1688), reprinted in T-E
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

159
160
161
162

supra note 156, at 1286.

Id.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *139.
Id.
See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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The Founders' theory behind the Compensation Clause remains
elusive. In theory, any process-based concerns in the government's
conversion of property should be alleviated in the "public use" restriction and the enumerated powers of the federal government in Article
1.1 63 If arbitrariness alone were the concern, the "public use" requirement and the limited enumerated powers would have been sufficient
to protect property owners. 164 The Compensation Clause instead suggests that when the government singles out a property owner, the loss
is borne by a single individual who cannot easily seek a remedy
through the political process, and the property owner should expect
compensation. 165 Singling out, though, is not necessarily a prerequisite for physical invasions. 166 A destruction of property not only meets
the singling out requirement, but it also meets the physical invasion
requirement.
Instead, the compensation principle boils down to a fairness issue, and "we must say that compensation exists to insure that no more
of an individual's property rights will be taken from him than represents his just share of the cost of government.' '

67

If government con-

versions were limited to tort challenges, as many necessity destruction
claims have been limited, then the claims are subject to strict statutory
limits, the inevitable problem of sovereign immunity, and the reluctance of the government to open itself to suits.168 Unfortunately, the
problems inevitable in limited statutory liability often leave property

163 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2679-80 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the "public use" requirement "allows the government to
take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the
property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever" and
that "the Government may take property only when necessary and proper to the exer-

cise of an expressly enumerated power").
164 Jed Rubenfeld wrote an influential article in the Yale LawJournalincorporating
a sort of substantive due process analysis inherent to the Takings Clause and eviscerating this historical understanding of the public use requirement. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE LJ. 1077, 1119-24 (1993). Because substantive due process did not
reach the Court's jurisprudence until the late nineteenth century, A. Raymond Randolph, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly'sDraft Abortion Opinion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PtuB.
POL'Y 1035, 1046 (2006), it is unlikely that the Takings Clause necessarily involves this
anachronistic history.
165 See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 38 VA. L. REv. 1333,
1344-48 (1991).
166 Id. at 1352-53 (explaining that where a physical invasion has occurred, a compensable taking exists regardless of whether the property owner was singled out).
167 Stoebuck, supra note 114, at 588.
168 Levmore, supra note 165, at 1349-50.
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owners with the cost of the government's destruction of property. 6 9
Kent concedes these limitations, writing, "The remedy under the act
does not extend to allow a recovery in damages for merchandise in
the building when destroyed, and being the property of a third person."1 70 An Iowa statute limited the scope of necessity destruction liability so that if the government acted ultra vires, it was no longer liable
under the common law exception.17 1 Case after case reflects the inadequacy of compensating property owners under statutory tort liability.
C.

The Text of the Constitution and the Tradition of the Common Law

1. The Conflict
Once state constitutions adopted takings clauses that required
government compensation, states had to determine what to do with
the common law privilege of necessity. Theoretically, the new constitutional text trumped the old common law exception, and the destruction required compensation. Instead, the courts recognized that
a common law exception for necessity was built into the constitutional
text and did not require compensation. The states, and later the federal government, resisted altering the old common law, apparently,
because it was simply old.
For instance, New York enacted a constitution that included a takings clause.' 72 Fortunatus Dwarris's definitive interpretation of the
new constitution, however, relied heavily on old case law that had preserved this exception, or cases that had reached the conclusion that
the new constitution did not supersede the old common law.' 73 Commentator Platt Potter would later rely on Saltpetre and Mouse's Case,174
following Dwarris's emphasis that "our highest courts have held, that
this police power, or the law of overruling necessity, is not controlled
by this constitutional limitation." 75 Dwarris admitted that "all such
parts of the common law, &c., as are repugnant to this constitution
were abrogated," but concluded that "it is not clearly repugnant to the
169 For example, one New York statute was construed to permit compensation to
property owners for structures destroyed by the government during a New York fire,

but not for the loss of the goods inside the buildings. Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714,
733-34 (1848).

Another statute was construed to limit significantly the liability of

public officials, again to exclude liability for the goods inside buildings. Russell v.
Mayor of New York, 2 Denio 461, 467-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
170 JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *339 n.b.
171 Field v. Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575, 587 (1874).
172 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7.
173 DWARmS, supra note 78, at 445-48.
174 See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
175 DwARRis, supra note 78, at 445.
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constitution; but being adopted by it, is in effect a part of it."176 He
conceded, however, that the lack of compensation was "injustice" and
' 177
should be corrected "by proper legislation."

A similar tactic, though not as explicit, occurred in the application of the Federal Takings Clause. The Takings Clause was incorporated against the states in 1896, with the Court's determination that
compensation and eminent domain were "inseparably connected with
the other."'1 78 Therefore, a taking of private property for the state, or
"under its direction for public use," requires compensation for the
injured property owner.1 79 The Court held that even though the government did not retain title to the property, it nevertheless owed compensation for the taking. The Court embodied a principle broader
than the state's actual taking of the title, and included takings under
the state's direction. This holding is not dicta: the railroad had desired property, and the city of Chicago accordingly condemned it.18O
Actions that take place under the direction of the state, which include
its authorized common law directives, fall within the scope of the Fifth
Amendment.
The landmark case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 8 was the first
case to reconcile the privilege of public necessity with the Takings
Clause. Justice Holmes uneasily made an "odd comment" in Pennsylvania Coal about Bowditch.' 8 2 Pennsylvania Coal included a broad
statement about the nature of takings jurisprudence, which included
dicta that specified destruction and appropriation as identical constitutional takings.' 8 3 Holmes, however, included a huge exception to
takings:
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. It may be doubted how far exceptional cases, like the blowing up of a house to stop a conflagration, go-and if they go beyond
the general rule, whether they do not stand as much upon tradition
84
as upon principle.1
176 Id. at 446.
177 Id. at 449.
178 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897).
179 Id. at 241 (holding that a state taking of private property for public use without
compensation violates due process of law).
180 Id. at 230.
181 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
182 Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'Jurisprudence":The
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106
YALE L.J. 613, 656 (1996).

183

Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.

184

Id. at 415-16.
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Holmes admits that the force behind Bowditch is as much tradition as
principle, a bothersome concession for anyone reading the text of the
Constitution. If the Constitution can be ignored in light of preexisting traditions, the rule of law is called into question.
The statement reflects more about Holmes's own judicial philosophy and less about the actual text of the Constitution. Holmes stated
explicitly in Pennsylvania Coal that "[i] 11 general it is not plain that a
man's misfortunes or necessities will justify his shifting the damages to
his neighbor's shoulders."'8 5 The text of the Takings Clause applies
to property owners injured to the benefit of the public, and property
owners are so injured in emergency destruction. Robert Brauneis
notes, "Private necessity does not exempt a person from liability;
Holmes thought it was an anomaly that public necessity did."1 8 6

Holmes's judicial philosophy, however, accepted exceptions like the
privilege of public necessity under the doctrine of survivals.
Survivals are "rules that continue to exist by inertia even though
the law in general has discarded their original justifications."'1 7 Even
though Holmes did not necessarily agree with either the principle or
the application of the doctrine, he nevertheless continued to apply it
because of its long-standing history. Brauneis concludes, "Although
the public necessity doctrine persisted, other legal doctrines pointed
to the acceptance of a principle at odds with allowing 'public necessity' to justify uncompensated destruction of property."98 Though
the privilege did not comport with the text or the philosophy behind
the Takings Clause, it remained as a vestige of the old common law.
Seventy years after Pennsylvania Coal, the Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council 8 9 adopted Holmes's reasoning without any
analysis. The Court held that states cannot take away property rights
that never existed, and it looked to "background principles" 190 such as
nuisance law to determine whether those rights existed.1 9' Justice
Scalia included the necessity privilege among these built-in limitations
on property rights: "The principle 'otherwise' . . . [is] destruction of

'real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 416.
Brauneis, supra note 182, at 657.
Id. at 656.
Id.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

190 See Glenn P. Sugameli, Threshold Statutory and Common Law Background Principles
of Property and Nuisance Law Define if There Is a ProtectedProperty Interest, in TAKING SIDES
ON TAKINGS ISSUES § 7.1 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1029).

191

Id. § 7.1(a).
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510

grave threats to the lives and
spreading of a fire' or2to forestall other
19
He then cited Bowditch, a pre-incorporation
property of others."
of the Takings Clause to analogous
case, to dismiss the application
93 One commentary notes that California's
destruction situations.
a result of the
94
1
adopted the necessity privilege as
Customer Co. case
allowed states to carve out historic
logic in Lucas, which effectively
statutes.1 95 These exceptions to the
exceptions to the text of takings
persisted, often, as the "backplain text of the Takings Clause have
are under a nuisance theory.
ground principles" that Lucas suggests
2.

The Nuisance Exception

of the Takings Clause,
Just nineteen years before incorporation
exception to the Takings Clause in
the Court had allowed a nuisance
96
use of property that "will be
Mugler v. Kansas.' States may prohibit the safety of the public." 19 7
morals, or
prejudicial to the health, the
for losses, because property
The state does not need to compensate
from harming society with a "noxowners are inherently prohibited
9 8 In its broadest terms, "[ilndividuals in
ious use of their property."'
must be careful not to injure the
the enjoyment of their own rights
99 The state owes no compensation for regulations,
rights of others."'
is
"In the one case, a nuisance only
including regulation of nuisances:
property is taken away from an inabated; in the other, unoffending
ex20 0 Regardless of the validity of having a nuisance
nocent owner."
carve
to
the first place, an attempt
ception to the Takings Clause in
of the nuisance exception is, at
out the necessity exception by means
best, tenuous.
nuisance and necessity into
Courts and scholars have tried to join
an inert building is ordia single exception, arguing that "[allthough raging fire it can be said
by a
narily not a nuisance, when approached
tinder box, and thus poses a nuito take on the characteristics of a 20 1
Similarly, goods that an apsance-like threat to other buildings."
property surrounding a blockaded
proaching enemy may take or
16, 18-19
(quoting Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S.
192 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16
(1879)).
193 Id.
accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 117-23 and
7.1(a).
§
190,
note
supra
195 Sugameli,
(1887).
623
U.S.
123
196
197 Id. at 669.
198 Id.
dissenting)
How.) 504, 589 (1847) (McLean,J.,
199 The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5.
200 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
at 119-20.
201 DANA & MRLL, supra note 149,
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criminal may be extended by analogy to be considered a nuisance.
This analogy, however, proves too much. If a home in an increasinglycrowded neighborhood would better serve the health of the community as a park, that home becomes "a nuisance-like threat" to the community, because although the home is not actually injurious, the
community would be better off if it did not exist at all. The home
itself is not actually deleterious to the health of the community, but
the destruction of the home would benefit the community more. If
"nuisance" is so broadly defined for purposes of public necessity and
narrowly defined elsewhere, it loses credibility and becomes a doctrine that stretches and shrinks with convenience to evade the com202
pensation requirement of the Takings Clause.
Furthermore, an actual nuisance must exist before the state can
control it; the potential for a nuisance is not enough. As one federal
court has held, "[T] he actual existence of a public nuisance is an absolute condition precedent to the exercise of the power." 20 3 A house
that has not yet caught fire, a flour barrel not yet captured by the
enemy, or a warehouse commandeered by a criminal are not "actual
nuisances," but potential nuisances or not nuisances at all.
The primary case cited in defense of the necessity-nuisance analogy is the Supreme Court case Miller v. Schoene.2 0 4 Virginia ordered
Miller to cut down cedar trees that might spread a disease to nearby
apple trees, 2°5 though the disease did not diminish the value of the
cedars at all. 20 6 The state defined the nuisance as keeping plants that

host communicable diseases within the radius of apple orchards potentially harmed by that disease. 20 7 The Court agreed and quoted the
recent Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 2 0 8 opinion, which stated, "A nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard."20 9 In Schoene, the Court found that
the disease was simply in the wrong place, so the state could destroy
the property without compensation. It refused to consider the
202 See Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REv, 1, 50-51 (1971) ("Where the advantage obtained from a mandatory expenditure is enjoyed primarily, if not exclusively, by persons other than the one required to make it... the basic unfairness of the imposition
seems obvious.").
203 Miles v. Dist. of Columbia, 354 F. Supp. 577, 579-80 (D.D.C. 1973).
204 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
205 Id. at 277.
206 Id. at 278.
207 Id. at 279.
208 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
209 Id. at 388.
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"nicet[ies]" of common law nuisance or statutory regulation. 2 10 Instead, the Court invoked a necessity-like exception to defend this definition of a nuisance, and Schoene was often invoked in later case law
2 11
with an acceptance of this logic.

The facts of Schoene do not match its broad construction or alleged sweeping terms. The Court noted that Miller could use the
felled trees. 212 The primary concern, instead, was the loss of scenic
value: "The evidence tends to show that the land is more valuable
without them; but, when properly trimmed and kept in order, they
possess, or are supposed to possess, a scenic value. "2 1

Unlike public

necessity destruction cases, the property in Schoene retained value and
had not been completely destroyed.
The analogies to nuisance and to Schoene inadequately explain
how the public necessity exception falls outside the scope of the Takings Clause. Nuisance, however, is not the only evasive jurisprudence
that tries to justify the public necessity exception in the face of the
text of the Constitution. A host of other conclusory statements continue to defend the public necessity privilege.
3.

The Scope of the Takings Clause Exception

Courts have adopted several other arguments to distinguish takings from public necessity. First, some have limited the scope of the
Takings Clause to exercises of eminent domain. 21 4 Eminent domain,
however, is not the sole procedure available for the government to
take property. Actions for inverse condemnation are allowed even
without the process of eminent domain, and these takings require
compensation.2 1 5 According to Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,2 1 6 a physical

invasion of land is a compensable taking, regardless of the govern210 Schoene, 276 U.S. at 280.
211 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992); id. at 1048
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-26 (1978); id. at 145 n.8 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
212 Schoene, 276 U.S. at 277. The Virginia Supreme Court had implied that the
owner was allowed to keep the lumber, which could be chopped for fence posts and
firewood. Miller v. State Entomologist, 135 S.E. 813, 818-19 (Va. 1926), affd sub nom.
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
213 Miller, 135 SE. at 814.
214 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIvmn 284 (2005) ("The takings clause was
originally about the power of eminent domain, a state's power to take property for a
fair market price and use it for public purposes.").
215 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
216 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
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ment's desire to take title. 2 17 Additionally, this philosophy undercuts
the premise of cases like Pennsylvania Coal and Lucas, where a compensable taking exists where the regulation "goes too far. ' 2 18 Other
scholars agree: "Payment of compensation was the practice not only
when the government appropriated formal title to property, but also
when 'land was taken, used by the government, or damaged pursuant
to government authorization. "'2 1 9 Accordingly, many courts have not
restricted the scope of the Takings Clause to merely taking title.
Rather than restricting the Takings Clause, some courts have asserted that instances of necessity destruction are simply not within the
scope of the Fifth Amendment. These arguments read the public necessity privilege right out of the text of the Clause for various reasons,
none of which relate to the actual words of the Takings Clause. For
instance, Kent's oft-cited commentaries distinguish public necessity
from eminent domain, but he discusses the legal concepts together
because they so closely resemble each other. 220 Dwarris's interpretation of the New York Constitution awkwardly tries to unify common
law with constitutional text.22 ' Even though the constitutional text is

clear enough and broad enough to require compensation for destruction, commentators try to escape the plain meaning of the text. The
Supreme Court's distinctions, particularly in the military necessity
context, have been just as awkward.
In Mitchell v. Harmony,2 2 2 the Mexican trader and United States
citizen Harmony had his "horses, mules, wagons, goods, chattels, and
merchandise" seized, and the army under Mitchell impressed his
workers.2 23 The Court held that "private property may lawfully be
taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from falling into the
hands of the public enemy," but emphasized, "[u]nquestionably, in
such cases, the government is bound to make full compensation to
the owner."2 24 The Court continued to hold this position in United
217 See id. at 176-78 (interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution's Takings Clause,
which the Court equates with that of the Federal Constitution); Rubenfeld, supra note
164, at 1083-85 (summarizing the physical-invasion aspect of takings).
218 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
219 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 149, at 17 (quoting John F. Hart, Colonial Land
Use Law and its Significancefor Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. Rnv. 1252, 1284
(1996)).
220 See KENT, supra note 170, at *338-40.
221 See DWARRIS, supra note 78, at 445; supra note 175 and accompanying text.
222 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
223 Id. at 116.
224 Id. at 134.
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2 25
seized and impressed for use,
States v. Russell, where a steamer was 22 6
The Court continued its
but not appropriated, and later returned.
language regarding the
inclusive definition of takings with decorative
"impressed, approprinature of necessity, and it held that property
22 7 required "full compensation
ated, or destroyed" by the government
is
22 81 "[F] ull restitution" must be made if the situation
to the owner."
229 While one writer has described the
so "imperative and immediate."
230 the Court did not
dicta of Mitchell and Russell to be a "guarantee,"
destruction in a case of
confront the actual situation of military
necessity.
situation, it hastily retreated
When the Court finally did face that
Railroad,2 31 the military sought
from its dicta. In United States v. Pacific
into St. Louis during the Civil
to prevent the Confederate advance
destroyed by [General RosenWar, and "some of the bridges were
to prevent the advance of the
crans's] orders, as a military necessity,
sources, including Vattel, the
enemy." 23 2 Invoking a host of outside
233 the Court determined
maxim salus populi suprema lex, and Sparhawk,
Mitchell and Russell applied only
that the discussion of "destruction" in
when the government made
to compensation for property destroyed
23 4 It described military necessity as outside the scope
use of the land.
fact that the military takings in
of the Takings Clause, despite the
compensation because they were
23 5
Mitchell and Russell explicitly required
the scope of the Clause.
within
seemingly
use,
takings for public
this logic in the second
The Supreme Court continued to apply
23 6
States v. Caltex, the Army
half of the twentieth century. In United
to prevent the advancing Japadestroyed Filipino petroleum 2products
3 7 Consistent with Pacific Railroad, the
nese from using the facilities.
and Russell] is far broader
Court noted that the "language in [Mitchell

225 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871).
226 Id. at 631-32.
227 Id. at 628.
228 Id. at 629.
229 Id.
Benefits, Everyone Pays: Does the Fifth Amend230 C. Wayne Owen, Jr., Note, Everyone
ActiviIs Damaged During the Course of Police
ment Mandate Compensation WVhen Property
(2000).
290
277,
ties?, 9 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 277,
(1887).
227
U.S.
120
231
232 Id. at 229.
233 Id. at 234-35.
234 Id. at 239-40.
Mitchell v.
U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628-29 (1871);
235 United States v. Russell, 80
(1851).
Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134
236 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
237 Id. at 150-51.
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than the holdings." 238 The Court explained that it had not been appropriate for public use, but that the property "was destroyed that the
United States might better and sooner destroy the enemy."2 39 The
Court nevertheless refused to compensate Caltex for its loss. It also
unhelpfully stated, "No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish
compensable losses from noncompensable losses, Each case must be
judged on its own facts."2 40 A complete destruction of property, then,

had no categorical protection under the Takings Clause.
In YMCA v. United States,24 1 the Court continued to apply this
standard, again to the chagrin of Justices Black and Douglas. Riots
took protestors to the YMCA Building and the Masonic Temple in
Panama, where army troops barricaded themselves inside the
YMCA. 2 42 The alleged goal of the mission was to remove the rioters

from the Canal Zone, not to protect the businesses. 2 43 From the facts,
however, the Court found that the troops were actually protecting the
buildings, and not the Zone. 24 4 Stipulated facts stated the army's
2 45
command, which included "instructions to protect the property."

The Court emphasized that because "the private party [was] the particular intended beneficiary of the governmental activity, 'fairness and
justice' [did] not require that losses which may result from that activity 'be borne by the public as a whole,' even though the activity may
also be intended incidentally to benefit the public." 2 46 The justifica-

tion of Caltex again applied here, though the YMCA stood to benefit
directly from government intervention.
The result in YMCA, however, should not be overstated because
of the proximity of the benefit. In fact, Justice Stewart concurred to
emphasize that "[i]f United States military forces should use a building for their own purposes-as a defense bastion or command post,
for example-it seems to me this would be a Fifth Amendment taking,
even though the owner himself were not actually deprived of any per238 Id. at 153.
239 Id. at 155. Justice Douglas seized upon this language in his dissent, which was
joined by Justice Black, and described the destruction as "necessary to help win the
war." Id. at 156 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The destruction, he notes, "deprived the
enemy of a valuable logistic weapon." Id.
240 Id. at 156 (majority opinion).
241 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
242 Id. at 87-88.
243 Id. at 87, 90.
244 Id. at 90.
245 Id. at 91 (emphasis omitted) (quoting a fact sheet from the General Counsel of
the U.S. Department of the Army, to which the parties stipulated).
246 Id. at 92 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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sonal use of the building. ' 2 47 Justice Harlan went further and con-

curred in the result only, reflecting that if the military destroyed the
building to stop the rioters,
it would be difficult indeed to call the building's owner the 'particular intended beneficiary' of the Government's action. Nevertheless,
if the military reasonably believed that the rioters would have
burned the building anyway, recovery should be denied
for the
248
us.
before
case
the
in
denied
properly
is
it
reasons
same
The holding of Caltex continued to control the Court's analysis, and
the government's use of the property seemed more important than its
249
seizure of the property.
The Court readily accepted a distinction between a compensable
destruction and a noncompensable destruction exclusively on the basis of a historical exception. It continued to stack precedent against a
compensation requirement and distinguished destruction from use of
the property. Without regard to the text of the Clause or the principle of "fairness and justice," the Court flatly determined that this kind
of destruction did not require compensation. This history doomed
compensation for military destruction, and it collided with the Takings Clause, resulting in the generic exclusion of the police power.
4.

The Police Power Exception

Last among interpretive techniques that seek to justify excluding
necessity from compensable takings, courts have articulated the position that the exercise of the police power is not a taking. The argument is similar to the nuisance analogy, but it more generally
encompasses the state's police power role. Defining the police power,
however, has been a confusing body of law that unsuccessfully attempts to compartmentalize the necessity privilege.
Ernst Freund's treatise on the police power and the Constitution
tries to distinguish eminent domain from the police power. He writes,
"If we differentiate eminent domain and police power as distinct powers of government, the difference lies neither in the form nor in the
purpose of taking, but in the relation which the property affected
bears to the danger or evil which is to be provided against." 250 Freund
distinguishes property that the public uses to create a positive value,
which would fall under eminent domain, and property that the public
247 Id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
248 Id. at 97 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
249 Justice Black dissented with Justice Douglas and echoed Douglas's concerns set
forth in his Caltex dissent. Id. at 97 (Black, J., dissenting).
250

ERNsT FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546 (1904).
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does not use but prevents from generating a negative value, which
would fall under the police power. 25 1 He concludes that the community should be liable in cases of necessity,2 5 2 but the common law did
"not afford an adequate remedy in cases of sudden and extraordinary
emergency. "253 The common law did not provide justice to injured
property owners who could not recover compensation. He concedes
that war could create "constitutional anomalies." 254 This discussion,
however, does not address the actual text of the Constitution, and
Freund fails to explain adequately the distinction between a taking
and a complete destruction of property for public use merely classified under the police power.
The Texas Supreme Court has indicated that the police power
covers actions during "impending peril."2

55

It analyzed eminent do-

main and the police power, then held, "[t]he one can await the forms
and tardiness of the law; the other is governed by a necessity which
2 56
knows no law. Delay in the latter case may be certain destruction."
The rationale here suggests that if something is important or urgent
enough, the state acts with the police power and compensation is not
required. Again, this analysis runs afoul of the Supreme Court's own
analysis in cases like Pumpelly or the military seizure cases, where an
inadvertent physical invasion of property needed for war still requires
compensation.
Furthermore, the Lucas Court emphasized that compensation no
longer hinged upon this harm-benefit balancing test. Justice Scalia
wrote, "[Tlbe distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder." 25 7 He remarked that many regulations could be classified both ways, so the
distinction is unhelpful. 2 58 Instead, categorical rules for takings are
preferred, particularly when the classification can be drawn either
way. In the necessity cases, the destructions can easily be classified as
both harm-preventing and benefit-conferring. The destruction of a
home in the path of a fire prevents the further harm of an advancing
fire, but creates the benefit of a fire break that did not naturally exist;
the destruction of property that the approaching enemy may use prevents the future harm of a sustained enemy attack, but creates the
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258

Id. at 546-47.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565-66.
Keller v. Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614, 627-28 (Tex. 1879).
Id.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992).
Id. at 1024-25.
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benefit of strategic military action against the enemy; the destruction
of property surrounding a criminal prevents the harm that the criminal on the loose may cause, but it benefits society in contributing to
the capture of the criminal. In each situation the "eye of the beholder" creates an unworkable framework for the police power
definition.
The consensus among contemporary legal scholars has been to
accept this privilege without much question and to move on without
much explanation. David Dana and Thomas Merrill, for example, refuse to dissect the definition of the police power as it relates to necessity and choose instead to accept the Bowditch decision as
authoritative. They write that "it has been around for a long time, has
never been questioned, and has been characterized as falling squarely
within the state's police power." 25 9 Quite simply, the exception exists
and does not require compensation, regardless of how that exception
is reached. Justice Holmes's comment that this area of law is determined "as much upon tradition as upon principle" continues to control how courts interpret the text of the Constitution.
III.

A

MArTER OF POLICY

The Constitution may not support the common law privilege of
necessity destruction, but the exception arose because of a variety of
policy concerns. Those policy concerns have been overstated, and
they ignore the modern shift toward compensating any taking of
property when the sovereign previously owed no such obligation. The
most fascinating parallel to the doctrine of necessity, however, is the
maritime law of general average, which does require compensation
for property destroyed during necessity on the sea.
A.

General Average

The law of general average exists in the oft-ignored body of maritime law. It is older than even Roman law and first came from
Rhodes.2 6 0 If sailors must lighten a ship in times of emergency, then
all parties to the voyage contribute to compensate for the loss of the
cargo.2 6 ' This principle matches the principle behind compensation
for takings, except that it is limited to necessity on the sea: "What is
given, or sacrificed, in time of danger, for the sake of all, is to be
replaced by a general contribution on the part of all who have been
supra note 149, at 120.

259

DANA & MERJILL,
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RICHARD LOWNDES, THE LAW OF GENERAL AVRAGE I (Edward L. de Hart &

George Rupert Rudolf eds., 6th ed. 1922).
261 Id.
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thereby brought to safety."2 62 The destruction of property in a time of

necessity yields compensation for the injured property owner on the
sea, but not on land.
The sacrifice is not limited to the jettison of cargo, but includes
the sacrifice of portions of the ship and even other "extraordinary expenses." 2 63 The loss, and subsequently the appropriate share of the
compensation, "must be borne proportionably [sic] by all who are interested." 264 Despite its pejorative definition as "peculiar communism,"2 65 its application has never been seriously questioned for two

millennia. The American law of general average has four particular
requirements:
First, the sacrifice or expenditure has to be "extraordinary"; secondly, it has to be "voluntarily and reasonably" made; thirdly, it has
to be incurred in time of "peril;" and finally, the sacrifice or expenditure has to be incurred for the purpose of preserving the property
"imperilled [sic] in the common adventure."26 6
The "voluntariness" requirement excludes compensation for losses to
pirates or the weather. The loss must also benefit the "common adventure," a requirement that ostensibly matches "public use."
In land-based cases of public necessity, the four American elements of general average all apply. The loss is "extraordinary" and in
a time of "peril," because the loss is the total destruction of property
in a time of urgent necessity. The loss is "voluntary" because it has
been caused by an individual and not by the natural events themselves. Finally, the loss is for the "common adventure," because the
loss occurs to benefit the entire public.
The "common adventure" element does not appear to fit as
neatly into the analytical framework, because on a ship it is easy to
determine the number of the parties and the size of the benefit. In
the case of a fire, though, the community undoubtedly benefits, but
the number and the size are more difficult to determine. One recommendation suggests that the compensation should "be raised either
from the municipality at large, or from the specific district at risk by
262 Id.
263 The Star of Hope, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 203, 228 (1869); LowNDEs, supra note 260,
at 20.
264 LOWNDES, supra note 260, at 21 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Birkley v.
Presgrave, (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 86, 89 (K-B.) (Lawrence, J.)).
265 Id. at 1.
266 SUSAN HODGES, LAw OF MARINE INSURANCE 439 (1996) (quoting Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 41, § 66(2) (Eng.)).
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contract when the parties engage in a joint venture on the sea. 273

Lord Justice Bowen emphasized that under
[t]he maritime law, for the purposes of public policy and for the
advantage of trade, imposes in these cases a liability upon the thing
saved, a liability which is a special consequence arising out of the
character of mercantile enterprises, the nature of sea perils, and the
fact that the thing saved was saved under great stress and exceptional circumstances. No similar doctrine applies to things lost
27 4
upon land, nor to anything except ships or goods in peril at sea.
If these are the policy reasons behind general average, then they
ought also to apply in common law for public necessity. The injured
property owners are identically harmed on land or at sea. Their property, which would otherwise inevitably be lost, has been sacrificed for
the good of the community. The loss occurs under exceptional circumstances. The statement that "sea perils" require a unique form of
compensation is as vacuous an explanation as stating that the wooden
frames of most houses make them particularly vulnerable to fires.
Unique to maritime law is the "character of mercantile enterprises. ''27 5 During the sea voyage, all the parties on the ship seek the
common preservation of merchandise for a safe passage on the water.
The parties have a common interest in preserving their cargo, and so
they should pay when one party's cargo is sacrificed to save the rest.
In a similar manner, though not as tightly analogous, each community
member shares with all others a collective interest in the preservation
of property in the community.
While general average law supports the application of the principle to necessity destruction takings, it does not solve the problem of
Mouse's Case.27 6 Mouse brought suit for the jettison of cargo on a

river, but the court refused to hold the destroyer liable. To assume
that maritime law did not apply on the river where the episode took
place is probably incorrect, because a barge was able to navigate the
river and it therefore fell under the maritime jurisdiction of navigable
waterways. 2 77 The application of the public necessity exception, how-

ever, does not explain why the law of general average did not apply.
273

Id. at 20-26; LOWNDES, supra note 260, at 28.

274 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234, 248-49 (Bowen, Lord

J.).
275

Id.

276 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
277 But see Frederick B. Sussmann, The Defence of Private Necessity and the Problem of
Compensation, 2 OTTAWA L. REv. 184, 191 n.37 (1967) (stating that the law of general
average did not apply to Mouse's Case because the episode took place on a river).
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Because Mouse did not bring suit for general average against the
entire ship, but only a suit against a single actor, the court could not
apply general average. While Mouse had "a right to contributions towards his loss from those whose property is saved," he could not bring
a claim against the magister navis, the actor, or any individual.2 7 The
injured property owner could not request compensation from a single
individual but could only receive a remedy through the law of general
average, and receive a contribution from all. Even "though nothing
was there said about general average contributions, there can be little
doubt that if the jettison for the general safety has been lawful, the
rule of contribution applies, however it was made."27 9 Despite the fact
that Mouse's Case is the preeminent case that justifies no compensation, Mouse would be compensated under a parallel theory of law,
only because the destruction took place on a boat.
Several scholars have advocated some kind of application of general average to cases of necessity. Vattel compares eminent domain to
general average, holding, "The same rules are applicable to this case
2 80
as to the loss of merchandise thrown overboard to save the vessel."
Dwarris also admits, "In Marine losses of this nature the common law
has been able to establish a just rule of compensation and assessment;
and the same principle, so far as it is possible to apply it, would be
equally equitable in similar losses by land."28' The policy considerations behind general average and the very application of the law are
lucid, categorical, and uniformly applicable.
American courts have not read the law of maritime average with
such a jaundiced eye as to classify it a "peculiar communism;" indeed,
' 28 2
the Supreme Court has approvingly called it "[c)ommon justice."
While the Court has classified the voyage as a "sea risk," the Court
nevertheless allows reimbursement if a party "makes a sacrifice to
avoid the impending danger or incurs extraordinary expenses to promote the general safety." 283 The broader policy of "fairness and justice" articulated by the American courts suggests that justice demands
compensation for destructions of property that benefit the public. As
one article asked, "The common law, from the very beginning, justified the trespass for the private citizen who acted for the community;
why, then, should not the community reimburse in such cases
278
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also?" 28 4 If bad history and poor constitutional interpretation can no
longer prevent compensation, some other policy concern must be offered to block the exercise of "common justice."
B.

A Consistent Approach to Takings

Because the privilege of necessity does not fit the actual text of
the Constitution, the policy behind the Takings Clause, the traditional
exercise of the police power, or its maritime counterpart, the only
remaining basis for preserving the privilege lies in general policy considerations. Defenders of the privilege insist that certain policy benefits outweigh the harm caused to property owners. Even these policy
reasons, free from the constraints of constitutional interpretation, fail
to justify adherence to this privilege in light of the great losses borne
by citizens for the public's benefit.
Attempted policy justifications of the privilege overwhelmingly reject concern for the injured property owner. As a matter of policy,
this rejection is fundamentally contrary to the values of the early common law philosophers and the nation's Founders. The Takings
Clause reflected a new concern for individual rights, and in particular
property rights, during the founding era.28 5 The "inviolability of
property" became a valuable part of American legal policy. 286 As William Michael Treanor states, the Takings Clause "inculcated the belief
that an uncompensated taking was a violation of a fundamental
right."2 87 If compensation for injured property owners is the primary
policy concern in the United States, the policy behind the necessity
privilege must overcome this concern.
First, some argue that the privilege ensures that swift action will
be taken in times of necessity. If individuals are concerned with liability, "they may not act with the requisite dispatch to avert a larger disaster."28 8 Without the spectre of liability, individuals will act in the best
interest of the community.
The "swift action" theory has no historical support and does not
correctly consider the role of compensation in takings. The only historical example of hesitation for liability is the Great Fire of London
of 1666, a myth previously debunked.2 8 9 Additionally, if the public
284
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pays the compensation to the individuals harmed, then the actors
bear no personal liability, and the incentive to act remains the same.
While public officials may fear the wrath of an electorate who will hold
them accountable for payments for compensation for destroyed property, the electorate would presumably be more upset with a public
official who failed to prevent the spread of disaster in a time of need.
Second, the theory of ex ante compensation suggests that property owners benefit from lower insurance rates if individuals are permitted to destroy property for the benefit of the public. This
justification would only apply to public necessity relating to natural
disaster, because homeowners do not insure against acts of the military or the police. Dana and Merrill explain, "The practice of allowing the government to destroy buildings in the path of fire
significantly reduces the total amount of destruction caused by catastrophic fires. All owners thus receive implicit compensation in the
form of reduced insurance rates for giving up the right to ex post
compensation." 29 Property owners receive a benefit before destruction occurs, so the economic benefit is distributed according to the
economic risk of harm.
The ex ante theory assumes that all individuals have insurance
and still leaves property owners without compensation for their losses.
Not everyone purchases adequate insurance, so property owners may
still be injured more than the economic benefit received. 29 1 Additionally, insurance companies will reimburse the homeowner for natural
harm but not for destruction committed by the state. The homeowner has received the benefit of nominally lower insurance rates because the city may destroy property and lessen the risk of fire, but the
homeowner would be in a better position if his home were destroyed
by the fire. 292 Homeowners in the same situation receive radically dif-

ferent compensation depending on the cause of the destruction.
While everyone receives the same benefit of lower insurance, only
some receive compensation for destroyed property. Similarly-injured
property owners should receive similar compensation for their
injuries.
Third, an argument related to ex ante compensation is the causation argument. It states that "[ijf the claimant's property would have
been engulfed by fire in any event, then the government's intervention should not be regarded as the cause of its demise." 293 Freund
290
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insists, "Of course there can be no constitutional or moral duty of
compensation, where the property destroyed could not have been
saved in any event. '294 Another defense of the theory argues "that in
such a case the party has virtually made no sacrifice at all for the community." 295 The causation argument leaves homeowners in the same
position as the ex ante compensation theory does. Among identically
injured property owners, some would be compensated by insurance
while others would not. Injured property owners would again have no
source of compensation.
Finally, the valueless property theory states that because the property is valueless just before destruction, compensation is not required.
A home approached by fire, a sack of flour about to be seized by the
enemy, and a structure barricaded by a criminal all seem to be worthless at the moment they are destroyed, because they are in imminent
peril. Dana and Merrill argue that "the government's intervention
should not be regarded as the cause of its demise." 296 Judge Posner
has mused, "[Tllhere would always be the question whether, given the
approaching fire, the house that was pulled down to create a firebreak
2 97
had any positive market value at the instant before it was damaged."
The intervening cause of government action, then, harms only valueless property.
This theory, however, ignores the need for compensation for
goods destroyed exclusively by the government's action and again
leaves the property owner without a remedy. In cases like Bowditch,
the property owner may seek compensation for property that he could
have removed from harm before the disaster hit.29 8 Also, the property
owner again has no remedy through insurance, because imperiled
property does possess a value: the amount of compensation that an
insurance company would pay for the loss.
CONCLUSION

None of the policy justifications for the privilege of necessity destruction can stand against the "fairness and justice" principle that
property owners harmed to benefit the public should receive compensation. It is somewhat ironic, then, thatJustice Scalia's opinion in Lucas has been described as "characteristically hard-edged, looking for a
294 FREUND, supra note 250, at 565.
295 Hall & Wigmore, supra note 267, at 506.
296 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 149, at 119.
297 Warner/Elektra/Atlantic Corp. v. County of DuPage, 991 F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th
Cir. 1993).
298 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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